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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #03133-84/1
30 May 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: [REDACTED]
National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa [REDACTED]

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Community representatives and specialists met on 22 May 1984 with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you. [REDACTED]

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CHAD

There has been a flurry of activity in recent weeks by the various parties involved in the Chad situation. This activity seems to have been of the "peace-feeler" variety, but no important breakthrough occurred. The French talked to the Libyans in April and Qadhafi subsequently sent a letter through the Austrians to Mitterrand. The letter is reported to have stated nothing new and the Libyans effectively said they will not withdraw unless the French abandon Habre. Chadian government representatives have talked with dissidents and Libyans in Brazzaville but no progress was evident. Representatives of the Goukouni dissident group have also been traveling, trying to stay in touch with African governments who have an interest in the Chad problem. [REDACTED]

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Some of the movement that has been taking place may stem from the realization--particularly on Qadhafi's part--that the French do not intend to leave. The dissidents may be casting about for other options because they now realize that Qadhafi does not intend to move further south against the French. [REDACTED]

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Forecast: It is unlikely that there will be any significant changes in the Chadian situation over the next six months. Habre will remain in place backed solidly by the French and the Chad question will not be a serious issue when the OAU convenes later this year. Economic problems and popular malaise in Libya will not be enough to prompt Qadhafi to withdraw from Libya. One factor that might motivate Qadhafi to leave Chad would be his perception that opposition to him within the military was growing and that a withdrawal would soften the military's discontent. [REDACTED]

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SUDAN

The internal situation in Sudan remains tense. Nimeiri's Islamization policy and the recently declared state of emergency--highlighted by a crackdown on corruption and the establishment of so-called emergency courts--is beginning to create a backlash. The military has not been able to blunt the insurgency in the south. The insurgents may intend to "liberate" an area in eastern and southern Sudan adjacent to the Ethiopian border to demonstrate their effectiveness, thereby hoping to attract more outside support. [REDACTED]

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CAMEROON

There is a general consensus within the Community that the political situation remains fragile. Analysts are uncertain, however, about how to assess President Biya's role since the unsuccessful coup attempt. Some divergency of views exists concerning the degree to which Biya is in control of the situation. The CIA analyst suggested that despite appearing to take firm actions, Biya has not reestablished his former position. Others believe that the president is beginning to regain momentum in the actions he has taken to date to cope with the post-coup attempt situation. [REDACTED]

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CUBAN INTENTIONS AND PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA AND ANGOLA

Analysts from CIA's Office of African and Latin American Analysis briefed the meeting on the Cuban drawdown of troops in Ethiopia and the issues that are central to a Cuban decision to remain in or withdraw from Angola. [REDACTED]

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Ethiopia

The resumption of Cuban troop rotations to Ethiopia earlier this month suggests the withdrawal of Cuban forces from that country has been completed. Cuban combat personnel in Ethiopia serve a two-year tour of duty and prior to the fall of 1983, approximately 25 percent of them were rotated every six months. This usually involved three voyages by a Soviet passenger ship between Assab and Havana, each carrying 600-700 troops. Last fall, however, coincident with other reports of the withdrawal of Cubans from Ethiopia, the Soviet ship made only one trip from Assab to Havana without returning, but made three trips from Havana to Angola. [REDACTED]

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In the spring of 1984, Cuban troop rotation to Ethiopia resumed with one round-trip voyage by a Soviet ship carrying 550 Cuban soldiers. If the past pattern of rotating 25 percent of the Cuban forces is still valid, this indicates a residual Cuban troop presence in Ethiopia of 2,000-2,500 men. Cuba probably would not have brought fresh troops to Ethiopia if they did not intend to keep them there for at least a year or two. [REDACTED]

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AngolaArguments for a Prolonged Stay in Angola

1. Defending Angola from "racist" South Africa is good for Cuba's image in Africa and elsewhere.
2. Cuban assistance to Angola is psychologically and ideologically important as a way for young Cubans to pay their dues in a revolutionary society.
3. It alleviates unemployment at home.
4. It is an important source of hard currency.
5. Cuban assistance to Angola is an important way of earning continued Soviet economic and military aid.
6. Failure to withdraw from Angola at this time denies President Reagan a victory to aid him in his reelection campaign.
7. Withdrawal under current circumstances means the failure of a nine-year investment.
8. Withdrawal would weaken the struggle against South Africa itself, namely, it would complicate aiding the ANC and SWAPO.
9. The Cuban presence in Angola provides opportunities for stealing luxury and manufactured goods and sending them to Cuba; also, Cuba makes money as Angola's purchasing agent for many imports.
10. It feeds Castro's ego, increases his political stature, and promotes him from only a national or regional political figure to world status.

Arguments Against a Long Stay

1. Casualties are very unpopular. Cuban casualties from the recent UNITA bombing in Huambo were buried in Angola in order to minimize the impact of the deaths in Cuba.
2. Angola is having difficulty making hard currency payments to Cuba.
3. Angola duty is not popular among Cuban troops (some have had two or three tours there).
4. Cuba doesn't want to be viewed as an obstacle to peace and Namibian independence.

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5. The Angola and Mozambique agreements with South Africa shook Castro's confidence in dos Santos and Machel, damaged his ego by cutting him out of negotiations of potentially great historical importance, and robbed him of any degree of control over events affecting his vital interests. His trust in them is diminished and with it his readiness to go the last mile for them.

6. Castro does not want to oppose such African figures as Kaunda and Nyerere.

7. Withdrawal bolsters home defenses at a time of increasing US threat.

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